A tool proposal to detect operating anomalies in the Spanish wholesale electricity market
José M. Cansino,
María J. Colinet and
Energy Policy, 2020, vol. 142, issue C
The Spanish wholesale electricity market remains controversial due to the suspicion of there being collusive behaviour, as the main generation companies still share 55% of the wholesale market. Up to 2018, the Spanish National Competition Authority had to investigate all the complaints received, contributing to discouraging collusive behaviours in the electricity market but also employing a significant amount of resources. Since 2018, the ECN + Directive has given more independence to the National Competition Authorities of EU Member States and has allowed them to reject the complaints that are not considered a priority and choose the most relevant ones.
Keywords: Electricity wholesale market; LMDI-I; Spatial decomposition; Pool price; National competition authority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:142:y:2020:i:c:s0301421520302287
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