Counteracting market concentration in renewable energy auctions: Lessons learned from South Africa

Wikus Kruger, Ivan Nygaard and Lena Kitzing ()

Energy Policy, 2021, vol. 148, issue PB

Abstract: Competitive bidding programmes, or auctions, are becoming the dominant method for procuring utility-scale renewable energy generation capacity and have coincided with significant cost reductions of renewable energy (RE) technologies. The use of price in auctions as the main awarding criterion has been criticized for apparently leading to market concentration and dominance in project ownership. We investigate: to what extent South Africa's renewable energy auction programme has contributed to market concentration and dominance; if market concentration and dominance have a negative impact on electricity cost in the auction; and to what extent measures taken to counteract market concentration and dominance have led to improved competition and diversity of project ownership.

Keywords: Renewable energy; Auctions; Market concentration; South Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:148:y:2021:i:pb:s0301421520307060

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111995

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