 Electricity market design and renewable energy auctions: The case of BrazilMaurício T. Tolmasquim, Tiago de Barros Correia, Natália Addas Porto and Wikus Kruger Energy Policy, 2021, vol. 158, issue C Abstract: Auctions have recently become the most widely adopted approach globally to procure renewable energy projects. Countries starting to use auctions often struggle to secure sufficient bidder interest – resulting in limited competition levels and high project prices. Brazil, a pioneer in the use of auctions to stimulate investment in renewable energy projects, offers important lessons on not only how auctions can be designed and implemented to stimulate competition and deliver effective investment outcomes, but importantly also shows how auctions form part of the country's electricity markets and can be integrated in a country's broader institutional and policy framework to ensure long-term success. This paper presents the detailing and specifications throughout the process of contracts and auction design definition to integrate renewable energy sources (RES) into the electrical matrix, from the institutional and procedural side to policy implications of securing the revenue stream and addressing off-taker risk between the sellers and buyers of electricity sector. Keywords: Renewable energy; Electricity market; Energy auctions; Market design (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:158:y:2021:i:c:s0301421521004286 DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112558 Access Statistics for this article Energy Policy is currently edited by N. France More articles in Energy Policy from Elsevier |
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