Empirical evidence on discrimination in multi-technology renewable energy auctions in Europe

Julius Buschle, Vasilios Anatolitis and Patrick Plötz

Energy Policy, 2024, vol. 184, issue C

Abstract: Auctions are a widely used policy instrument to support the deployment of renewable energies (RE). Yet, their complex design raises concerns about explicitly or implicitly discriminatory effects against particular technologies. Such discriminatory effects would distort fair competition, reduce economic efficiency, and potentially violate European Union law.

Keywords: Renewable energy auctions; Discriminatory auction design; Multi-technology auctions; Technology-neutral auctions; Fractional logit model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:184:y:2024:i:c:s030142152300438x

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113853

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