Grandfathering, auctioning and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new ETS Directive

Stefano Clo ()

Energy Policy, 2010, vol. 38, issue 5, 2420-2430

Abstract: The new ETS Directive defines three different allocation rules, granting exemption from auctioning to those sectors exposed to the risk of Carbon Leakage. This article analyses the inconsistencies that characterize this new allocation rule and it concludes that the methodology designed to assess the risk of Carbon Leakage is more politically driven than economically grounded. The results of the Carbon Leakage risk assessment reveal that grandfathering is going to be the dominant allocation rule during the third phase also. However, not only the exemption from auctioning is unlikely to mitigate Carbon Leakage, instead of improving the allocation transparency and granting harmonization of higher rules but also the new ETS allocation rule is likely to increase the distortions of competition, worsening rather than improving the harmonization within the ETS.

Keywords: Climate; Package; Carbon; Leakage; Auctioning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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