Competition effects of mergers: An event study of the German electricity market

Andreas Keller

Energy Policy, 2010, vol. 38, issue 9, 5264-5271

Abstract: This paper investigates the competition effects of the entry of Vattenfall into the German electricity market. While the competition authorities supported the entry by approving Vattenfall's acquisition of three regional utilities, other market participants raised concerns over the emergence of an upcoming oligopoly in the German market for power generation. We contrast the efficiency hypothesis postulating pro-competitive effects of mergers with the market power hypothesis postulating anti-competitive effects. For the analysis of the two opposing hypotheses, we use an event study approach to the stock prices of Vattenfall's competitors in the German market. While we find no empirical evidence for increased market power in the German electricity market due to Vattenfall's mergers, there is some indication for efficiency increases. We therefore cannot oppose the view of the competition authorities predicting an overall positive effect for consumers as a result of Vattenfall's entry into the German electricity market.

Keywords: Electricity; market; Event; study; Horizontal; merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:9:p:5264-5271

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