Modeling generation expansion in the context of a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions. Application to the Colombian case

P. Rodilla, C. Batlle, J. Salazar and J.J. Sánchez

Energy Policy, 2011, vol. 39, issue 1, 176-186

Abstract: In an attempt to provide electricity generation investors with appropriate economic incentives so as to maintain quality of supply at socially optimal levels, a growing number of electricity market regulators have opted for implementing a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions. In this context, the ability to analyze long-term investment dynamics is a key issue not only for market agents, but also for regulators. This paper describes a model developed to serve this purpose. A general system-dynamics-inspired methodology has been designed to be able to simulate these long-term auction mechanisms in the formats presently in place. A full-scale simulation based on the Colombian system was conducted to illustrate model capabilities.

Keywords: Security; of; supply; Long-term; auctions; Electricity; market; modeling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:176-186

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