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Oil and resource-backed aggression

Jeff Colgan

Energy Policy, 2011, vol. 39, issue 3, 1669-1676

Abstract: A common misperception about oil politics is that it has a uniform, monolithic effect on policy development. This paper argues that in fact the net political effect of oil varies dramatically depending on the nature of the petrostate. It shows that oil income, when combined with revolutionary governments in petrostates, generates strong incentives for foreign policy aggression and international conflict. The aggressiveness of petro-revolutionary states is shown to have consequences in both military and economic spheres of international relations. Militarily, the aggressiveness of this type of state leads to a high rate of armed conflicts. Economically, the aggressiveness of petro-revolutionary states shapes global oil markets and international economic relations. The argument is tested using statistical analysis of international conflicts and economic sanctions. The policy implications are then considered, focusing on the negative global impacts of dependence on oil consumption.

Keywords: Resource; curse; International; conflict; Oil; wars (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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