Resource rents: The effects of energy taxes and quantity instruments for climate protection
Klaus Eisenack (),
Ottmar Edenhofer () and
Energy Policy, 2012, vol. 48, issue C, 159-166
Carbon dioxide emissions correspond to fossil resource use. When considering this supply side of climate protection, crucial questions come to fore. It seems likely that owners of fossil resources would object to emission reductions. Moreover, policy instruments such as taxes may not be effective at all: it seems individually rational to leave no fossil resources unused. In this context, it can be expected that economic sectors will react strategically to climate policy, aiming at a re-distribution of rents.
Keywords: Resource extraction; Supply side; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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