Price-capping in partially monopolistic electricity markets with an application to Italy

Bruno Bosco, Lucia Parisio and Matteo Pelagatti

Energy Policy, 2013, vol. 54, issue C, 257-266

Abstract: In many electricity markets the production capacity of a single supplier may be necessary to satisfy the total demand even when its competitors offer their total capacity. These pivotal suppliers are expected to sell at monopolistic prices on their portions of the market demand.

Keywords: Electricity auctions; Price cap; Optimal bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:54:y:2013:i:c:p:257-266

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.029

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