Development of a virtual power market model to investigate strategic and collusive behavior of market players

Miadreza Shafie-khah, Mohsen Parsa Moghaddam and Mohamad Kazem Sheikh-El-Eslami

Energy Policy, 2013, vol. 61, issue C, 717-728

Abstract: In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated.

Keywords: Collusive behavior; Strategic behavior; Virtual power market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:61:y:2013:i:c:p:717-728

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.003

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