On distributive effects of optimal regulation for power grid expansion

Luis Ángel Herrera and Juan Rosellon

Energy Policy, 2014, vol. 69, issue C, 189-204

Abstract: To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been identified. To discern these parameters is the motivation for the research presented in this paper. We study how different weight parameters affect the distributive characteristics of optimal price-cap incentive regulation for electricity transmission. We find that a regulator׳s use of ideal (Laspeyres) weights tends to be more beneficial for the Transco (consumers) than for consumers (the Transco).

Keywords: Electricity transmission; Incentive regulation; Distributive efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514001001
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On Distributive Effects of Optimal Regulation for Power Grid Expansion (2013)
Working Paper: On Distributive Effects of Optimal Regulation for Power Grid Expansion (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:69:y:2014:i:c:p:189-204

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.011

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Policy is currently edited by N. France

More articles in Energy Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().