Setting up charging electric stations within residential communities in current China: Gaming of government agencies and property management companies

Tian Wu, Lin Ma, Zhonggen Mao and Xunmin Ou

Energy Policy, 2015, vol. 77, issue C, 216-226

Abstract: The difficulty of charging electric vehicles (EVs) is now hindering their further development. Governments generally choose to build stations for home charging (including piles) within residential communities. Given the conflict of interest between various government agencies and property management companies, constructing a charging station within residential communities would result in welfare loss for the property management companies and therefore lead to the principal–agent problem. This paper constructs a two-period imperfect information game theory model to study the moral hazard involved in this issue and government agencies׳ optimal choice. In the analytic solution of the model, we find that the optimal choice for a farsighted government agency is to constantly improve the incentive mechanism and introduce charging stations only when the conflict of interest is eliminated. Any benefits derived from government regulations by force would prove short-lived. The government should focus on long-term returns in the development of EVs, and its optimal mechanism should be designed to mitigate the principal–agent problem of property management companies, thereby accelerate the progress of EV charging infrastructure and improve overall social welfare.

Keywords: Electric vehicle; Electric charging station; Game theory model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:77:y:2015:i:c:p:216-226

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.10.012

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