Does OPEC act as a cartel? Empirical investigation of coordination behavior

Khalid Kisswani

Energy Policy, 2016, vol. 97, issue C, 171-180

Abstract: In this paper I use quarterly and monthly data from 1994 to 2014 to test if OPEC acts as a cartel, and therefore, it affects oil prices through members' coordination. I use Engle and Granger two-step approach, Johansen cointegration test and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach of cointegration to examine the long-run relation between OPEC production and each member's production as an evidence of coordination. Besides, I apply Granger causality and Toda and Yamamoto tests to check the direction of causality between the OPEC production and oil prices (U.K. Brent and Dubai Fateh). The findings show no evidence of cointegration between the production of the members and that of OPEC, indicating no cartel behavior exists. Moreover, the results show that OPEC production does not cause oil prices; rather it is the other way around.

Keywords: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Cartel; Unit root; Cointegration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421516303652
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:171-180

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.07.013

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Policy is currently edited by N. France

More articles in Energy Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().