The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?
Daniel Ackerberg and
Explorations in Economic History, 2000, vol. 37, issue 3, 241-257
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