From internal taxes to national regulation: Evidence from a French wine tax reform at the turn of the twentieth century
Noel Johnson () and
Explorations in Economic History, 2014, vol. 51, issue C, 77-93
The growth of the modern regulatory state is often explained in terms of an unambiguous increase in regulation driven by the actions of central governments. Contrary to this traditional narrative, we argue that as governments increased state capacity, they often strove to weaken the autarkic tendencies of regional laws, thereby promoting greater trade and a more integrated market. To show this, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment generated in the French wine industry by a law implemented on 1 January 1901 which lowered and harmonized various local tax rates.
Keywords: Regulation; State and local taxation; Market integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:exehis:v:51:y:2014:i:c:p:77-93
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