Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820

Marco Casari, Maurizio Lisciandra () and Claudio Tagliapietra

Explorations in Economic History, 2019, vol. 71, issue C, 72-92

Abstract: Does property rights allocation on the commons affect marriage strategies and fertility? We focus on the role played by patrilineal vs. egalitarian inheritance systems. Our approach combines a theoretical model and an empirical study that exploits an institutional shock at the turn of the 19th century, which made inheritance on the common property-resources egalitarian for everyone. We report that – as predicted by the model – communities with patrilineal inheritance rights on the commons exhibit higher levels of endogamy and consanguinity and lower fertility than those with egalitarian inheritance rights.

Keywords: Common-pool resources; Inheritance; Land tenure; Napoleon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 N53 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:exehis:v:71:y:2019:i:c:p:72-92

DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2018.09.001

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