 Resignation of independent directors, restructuring of political ties, and the introduction of state-owned capital in private enterprises: Evidence from ChinaCao Wei, Xu Wei and Zhao Can International Review of Financial Analysis, 2025, vol. 105, issue C Abstract: This study examines the role of independent directors with government backgrounds in facilitating the introduction of state-owned capital into private enterprises, focusing on the restructuring of political connections. The findings reveal that the resignation of these directors significantly accelerates the integration of state-owned capital, particularly when the director is a government official with strong ties to the company's location or industry. The effect is most pronounced in firms with greater financing constraints, weaker political connections, and those operating in regions with unfavorable business environments and high policy uncertainty. Furthermore, the study highlights that restructuring political connections helps private enterprises access critical resources, such as bank loans and government subsidies, enhancing their operational resilience. Keywords: Resignation of government-affiliated independent directors; Corporate political strategy; Private enterprises; State-owned capital (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:105:y:2025:i:c:s1057521925004934 DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104406 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Financial Analysis is currently edited by B.M. Lucey More articles in International Review of Financial Analysis from Elsevier |
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