CEO incentive compensation in U.S. financial institutions

Gloria Y. Tian and Fan Yang

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2014, vol. 34, issue C, 64-75

Abstract: This paper empirically addresses the questions of whether and, if yes, how U.S. bankers are compensated in particular with regard to incentive pay. Although the level of bank CEO pay has dropped during the financial crisis period, bank CEOs fared much better in comparison to their firms (and, in turn, their shareholders). Furthermore, bank CEO incentive pay beyond the justifiable portion is positively associated with CEO power measures. There is also some evidence, albeit weaker, that CEO power is positively related to CEO incentive pay switches.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Financial institutions; CEO power; Financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:64-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2014.05.008

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