Executive political connections and firm performance: Comparative evidence from privately-controlled and state-owned enterprises

Shujun Ding, Chunxin Jia, Zhenyu Wu and Xiaoqing Zhang

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2014, vol. 36, issue C, 153-167

Abstract: This study examines the effects of ultimate control and the political connections of top executives on firm's performance and the monitoring role played by boards of directors. It investigates whether the political influence of ownership and that of management are complements or substitutes in their effects on board independence and accounting performance. The findings indicate that the state holding in SOEs (state-owned enterprises) weakens board independence, but improves accounting performance. The positive effect of a board chair's political connections on firm-level performance is only documented in SOEs.

Keywords: Political connections; Performance; Ultimate control; Privately-controlled enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:36:y:2014:i:c:p:153-167

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2013.12.006

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