The effect of ownership structure on the price earnings ratio — returns anomaly

Robert Houmes and Inga Chira

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2015, vol. 37, issue C, 140-147

Abstract: It is well known that firms with low price to earnings ratios (value firms) earn higher stock returns in the long term than high price to earnings firms (growth firms). This study investigates how insider ownership affects this relation. We show that when insider ownership is high, returns decline for low P/E firms and improve for high P/E firms. These findings are rationalized in the context of entrenchment and alignment of incentive effects. For low P/E firms, low stock returns reflect the inability of boards of directors and outside shareholders to influence poorly performing entrenched management. For high P/E firms, boards of directors and outside shareholders are less likely to intervene since higher returns reflect increased agency incentives for value-creating managers.

Keywords: Agency theory; Governance; Insider ownership; Ownership structure; Price to earnings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:140-147

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2014.11.017

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