Controlling shareholders and market timing: Evidence from cross-listing events
Omar A. Esqueda
International Review of Financial Analysis, 2017, vol. 49, issue C, 12-23
We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exhibit an increase in firm value. Yet, investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-controlled cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned cross-listings, insider-owned firms have a greater rise in value around the cross-listing year but also a larger decline in the post-cross-listing years. In fact, insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year, compared with their value before cross-listing. Lastly, we show that liquidity and visibility enhance the value of cross-listings.
Keywords: Cross-listings; Market timing; Insider ownership; Firm value; Bonding hypothesis; Tobin's q; Sarbanes-Oxley (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:12-23
Access Statistics for this article
International Review of Financial Analysis is currently edited by B.M. Lucey
More articles in International Review of Financial Analysis from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().