Asset sales and subsequent acquisitions

Giang Nguyen and Le Vu

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2018, vol. 60, issue C, 87-97

Abstract: In this paper, we find that the decisions to retain asset sale proceeds are positively related to the likelihood of subsequent acquisitions. We demonstrate that retention decisions destroy the wealth of shareholders. First, we document negative market reactions towards a retention decision, and the effect is more pronounced when the decision is followed by an unexpected acquisition. Second, we show that subsequent acquisitions reduce the wealth of shareholders, especially when the acquisitions are unexpected by the market. Third, retention sellers' long-run performance declines when they pursue an acquisition following the sale of their assets. Altogether, we provide novel evidence suggesting that retention sellers tend to reallocate proceeds to specific acquisitions that are detrimental to shareholders' wealth.

Keywords: Asset sale; Acquisition; Retention; Payout; Announcement return (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:60:y:2018:i:c:p:87-97

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2018.09.005

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