Fetching better deals from creditors: Board busyness, agency relationships and the bank cost of debt
Vu Quang Trinh,
Abdullah A. Aljughaiman and
Ngan Duong Cao
International Review of Financial Analysis, 2020, vol. 69, issue C
Abstract:
In a cross-country setting, we document that busy boards of directors (i.e., outside directors with multiple directorships) enhance a bank's financing capacity by lowering its cost of debt, which is consistent with the signalling quality hypothesis. Our analysis further reveals that this negative association is more pronounced in conventional banks than their Islamic counterparts. Possibly owning to the distinctive governance structure and the complexity of the Islamic business model, which requires closer monitoring, Muslim debtholders might depreciate a busy board of directors as it is likely to associate with lower scrutinising effectiveness. Our results provide a positive counterpoint to the negative relationship that exists between busy directors and firm performance, and contributes to understanding the indispensable role busy boards play in debt financing.
Keywords: Board busyness; Islamic banks; Conventional banks; Cost of debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 G01 G21 G28 L50 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521920301162
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:69:y:2020:i:c:s1057521920301162
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101472
Access Statistics for this article
International Review of Financial Analysis is currently edited by B.M. Lucey
More articles in International Review of Financial Analysis from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().