Tournament-based incentives and mergers and acquisitions

Nam H. Nguyen, Hieu V. Phan, Hung V. Phan, Dung T.T. Tran and Hong Vo

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2020, vol. 71, issue C

Abstract: This research examines the relation between tournament-based incentives, which are proxied by the difference between a firm's CEO pay and the median pay of the senior managers, and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that tournament-based incentives are positively related to firm acquisitiveness and acquiring firms' stock and operating performance. Further analysis indicates that positive acquisition performance increases the likelihood of the CEO being promoted from inside the acquiring firm. Our evidence is consistent with the view that tournament-based incentives motivate acquiring firms' managers to make greater efforts and take more risk that result in superior acquisition performance.

Keywords: Merger and acquisition; Executive compensation; CEO pay gap; Tournament incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:71:y:2020:i:c:s1057521920301927

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101548

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