Can minority investor activism promote corporate risk-taking? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Shen Chen, Yuran Chen, Di Zhang and Jinmei Wang

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2023, vol. 85, issue C

Abstract: In this study, we investigate the potential of minority investor activism to alleviate risk-related agency problems. We focus on the China Securities Investor Services Centre (CSISC), a not-for-profit minority investor promoted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission to protect the interests of minority investors. Taking the popularity of the CSISC as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that CSISC shareholding significantly promotes corporate risk-taking. We also find that this positive effect is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder has a lower shareholding ratio or the counterbalancing force of other shareholders is larger. Large cash holdings and financial capacity, fierce market competition, and being in a non-high-tech industry also strengthen the role of the CSISC. Further, our analysis of the economic consequences of CSISC shareholding demonstrates that it can improve investment efficiency, constrain insiders' tunnelling activities, and improve information quality. Overall, the results shed light on the effectiveness of the CSISC in increasing investor activism and restraining insiders' risk aversion. As such, our findings have policy implications for the protection of minority investors.

Keywords: Minority investor; Shareholder activism; Investor protection; Risk aversion; Corporate risk-taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:85:y:2023:i:c:s1057521922003805

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102430

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