 Do central bankers' characteristics matter for Africa? Ethnic favoritism, fractionalization, and inflationChristine Strong and Constant L. Yayi International Review of Financial Analysis, 2024, vol. 94, issue C Abstract: Using a newly constructed dataset over the period 1984–2017 for 21 African countries, this study investigates the influence of central bankers' personal characteristics, including educational and professional backgrounds, as well as ethnic affiliation, on inflation. The central hypothesis posits that shared ethnic affiliation between the central banker and the head of the executive branch signals an alliance between monetary and fiscal authorities, suggesting a preference for a more accommodating central banker. The results strongly support the existence of ethnic favoritism, indicating that the impact of joint ethnicity on inflation is contingent on the level of ethnic diversity within a country. Notably, as ethnic diversity increases, joint ethnicity results in a more modest reduction in inflation. Additionally, the analysis reveals that in ethnically diverse settings, inflation tends to be lower when there is ethnic alignment between the central banker and the head of state, compared to scenarios without such alignment. Keywords: Ethnic affiliation; Ethnic fractionalization; Favoritism; Central bank governors; Ally; President; Inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:94:y:2024:i:c:s1057521924001881 DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103256 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Financial Analysis is currently edited by B.M. Lucey More articles in International Review of Financial Analysis from Elsevier |
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