Unintended consequences of the introduction of specialized bankruptcy courts: evidence from zombie lending
Chun Liu,
Shilin Liang and
Liang Sun
International Review of Financial Analysis, 2024, vol. 96, issue PB
Abstract:
We examine the economic consequences of the introduction of specialized bankruptcy courts (SBCs) from the perspective of zombie lending, using a sample of Chinese listed zombie firms in the 2016–2021 period. We find that the introduction of SBCs unexpectedly and significantly increases zombie lending, given the perverse incentives for banks and the intervention of local governments. The mechanism is that the introduction of SBCs improves the firms' bankruptcy efficiency, which increases the exposure probability of banks' bad loans and regional unemployment. To conceal these bad loans and unemployment, banks and local governments have to dramatically increase zombie lending. Thus, while better bankruptcy procedures are typically assumed to discourage zombie lending, we show that the introduction of SBCs may instead encourage such lending by exacerbating conflicts among creditors and political-economic frictions.
Keywords: Specialized bankruptcy courts; Zombie lending; Perverse incentives for banks; Local government intervention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G33 G38 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:96:y:2024:i:pb:s1057521924006276
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103695
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