Compensation and competition for talent: Evidence from the financial industry

Mariassunta Giannetti and Daniel Metzger

Finance Research Letters, 2015, vol. 12, issue C, 11-16

Abstract: We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and this association is stronger in markets with high competition for talent. We argue that this evidence supports models of competition for talent based on retention motives.

Keywords: Competition for talent; Retention; Optimal contracts; Finance labor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J31 J33 J41 J44 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:12:y:2015:i:c:p:11-16

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2014.12.007

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