Optimization of brokers’ commissions

Sebastien Lemeunier

Finance Research Letters, 2017, vol. 20, issue C, 137-145

Abstract: For decades, the literature has questioned the role of financial advisers and the interests of investors who purchase load funds. Many conflicts of interest are stressed. To go beyond a normative approach, this paper uses the harmonized structure of the US distribution system of load funds and the consequent commissions to understand better the choice criteria of brokers. These choice criteria are unstable and are affected by risks related to the probability of withdrawal of the investor and the performance of the fund. This model may be used to provide explanations for the allocation of funds among share classes.

Keywords: Mutual funds; Broker dealer; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G24 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:20:y:2017:i:c:p:137-145

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2016.09.011

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