The elimination of broker voting in director elections

Ali C. Akyol, Konrad Raff and Patrick Verwijmeren

Finance Research Letters, 2017, vol. 21, issue C, 34-39

Abstract: In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.

Keywords: Shareholder voting; Director elections; Securities and Exchange Commission; Board effectiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:21:y:2017:i:c:p:34-39

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001

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