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Shareholder rights in mergers and acquisitions: Are appraisal rights being abused?

Jonathan Kalodimos and Clark Lundberg

Finance Research Letters, 2017, vol. 22, issue C, 53-57

Abstract: Appraisal rights grant dissenting shareholders in an acquisition the right to petition the court to determine the value of their shares. These rights can protect shareholders from acquisitions below fundamental value or can be abused by opportunistic investors. We examine the use of appraisal rights and find the evidence is most consistent with appraisal rights functioning as recourse when the target firm is sold below fundamental value.

Keywords: Appraisal rights; Mergers and acquisitions; Takeover law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:22:y:2017:i:c:p:53-57