Communist party committee direct control and the market value of corporate cash holdings

Xiaorong Li, Fan Zhang and Kam C. Chan

Finance Research Letters, 2017, vol. 23, issue C, 179-189

Abstract: We study the impact of having a communist party committee (CPC) member directly involved in the management of a firm on the market value of cash. Our findings suggest that the CPC member can enhance the market value of cash only when he or she is a director of the board. When the CPC members are supervisors of a supervisory board or senior management, they have no effect.

Keywords: Communist party control; Cash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:23:y:2017:i:c:p:179-189

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.05.008

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