CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: Evidence from US banks

Yener Altunbas, John Thornton and Yurtsev Uymaz

Finance Research Letters, 2018, vol. 26, issue C, 1-8

Abstract: We test for a link between CEO tenure and misconduct by US banks. We find that banks are more likely to commit misconduct when CEOs have a relatively long tenure and banks have relatively poor balance sheets. Large and independent corporate boards can mitigate but not prevent misconduct.

Keywords: Corporate misconduct; CEO tenure; US banks; Probit; Bivariate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:26:y:2018:i:c:p:1-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003

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