Risk governance of financial institutions: The effect of ownership structure and board independence

Marion Dupire and Regine Slagmulder

Finance Research Letters, 2019, vol. 28, issue C, 227-237

Abstract: This paper investigates how the risk governance practices of European financial institutions quantitatively cluster on the corporate governance characteristics of the corporation, particularly ownership structure and board independence. Using hand-collected data on a sample of 54 banks and 33 insurance companies, we find that financial institutions with powerful owners (i.e., those with >20% ownership) have a lower chief risk officer (CRO) presence and lower risk committee presence. In addition, state-controlled institutions and institutions with more independent boards have more independent risk committees.

Keywords: Risk governance; Corporate governance; Financial institution; Risk management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:28:y:2019:i:c:p:227-237

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.05.001

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