CEO political preference and corporate innovation

Syungjin Han

Finance Research Letters, 2019, vol. 28, issue C, 370-375

Abstract: I demonstrate that CEOs’ personal political preferences influence corporate innovation. Firms managed by Republican CEOs tend to adopt more flexible employment policies exhibiting higher employment elasticity with respect to sales. They also tend to have a lower level of corporate innovation, as measured by the number of patents and subsequent citations. The results suggest that firms with Republican CEOs who provide less job security have a negative impact on employees’ innovation incentives.

Keywords: CEO; Innovation; Political preference; Employment policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 J28 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612318300369
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:28:y:2019:i:c:p:370-375

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.06.006

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().