Corporate governance convergence in the European M&A market

Wolfgang Drobetz and Paul P. Momtaz

Finance Research Letters, 2020, vol. 32, issue C

Abstract: Cross-border acquisitions lead to improvements in shareholder rights and more dispersed ownership structures in a large sample of intra-European takeovers. These findings are evidence of corporate governance convergence toward the Anglo-Saxon system through cross-border takeovers. However, we find no support for the corporate governance motive hypothesis in cross-border acquisitions even after accounting for potential sample selectivity. Although acquirers have significantly better shareholder rights than their targets, there are no robust marginal bidder wealth effects for firms that acquire either weaker or stronger governance foreign targets. Instead, bidder wealth effects in cross-border acquisitions are better explained by acculturation costs.

Keywords: Takeovers; Mergers and acquisitions; Corporate governance; Investor protection; Ownership structures; Bidder wealth effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:32:y:2020:i:c:s1544612318306421

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2019.01.003

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