Great Trees are Good for Shade: Creditor Monitoring Under Common Ownership

Luca Lin

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 44, issue C

Abstract: Existing studies show that common ownership across multiple industry firms improves corporate governance, because such common owners internalize governance externalities and possess industry-wide expertise. I study whether creditors perceive common owners as allied monitors or powerful expropriators. Using financial institution mergers to establish causality, I find that creditors impose less restrictive covenants on loans to firms with higher common ownership. It is mainly pronounced in financially risky firms with no blockholder or lower creditor bargaining power. This indicates that creditors account for the benefits from common ownership governance, and therefore exert less monitoring effort in firms with higher common ownership.

Keywords: Creditor Monitoring; Common Ownership; Corporate Governance; Loan Covenants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:44:y:2022:i:c:s1544612321001471

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102066

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