Inside trading with public information and market regulation

Hong Liu and Zaili Li

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 46, issue PA

Abstract: In this study, we examine the insider trading model in the context of public information and market regulation. We find that when there is only one insider trader, regulators do not apply regulatory strategies for insider trading. However, regulators will regulate insider trading more strictly when there are multiple insider traders. Meanwhile, regulatory participation leads to more stable but less efficient markets.

Keywords: Inside trading; Market-depth; Trading intensity; Market-efficient; Regulatory intensity; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D82 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:46:y:2022:i:pa:s1544612321002920

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102234

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