Debt enforcement and the cost of debt financing in M&As

Qing Liang and Zhaohua Li

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 47, issue PA

Abstract: We examine whether the debt enforcement affects the cost of debt securities in M&A transactions in 28 countries. Strong enforcement lowers the yield of securities. We show that legal enforcement affects the offering yield through the priority rule for creditors, which means senior debt creditors are paid in full first. The offering yield is higher for a security when a higher proportion of subordinated debts is used in an M&A transaction. However, strong enforcement improves a lender's chance of being paid back even for subordinated debt, so the offering yield is lower for subordinated debt in countries with better enforcement.

Keywords: Legal enforcement; Offering yield; The priority rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G23 K40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:47:y:2022:i:pa:s1544612321005584

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102620

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