Does the introduction of CSR criteria into CEO incentive pay reduce their earnings management? The case of companies listed in the SBF 120

Mohamed Khenissi, Abderrahman Jahmane and Mahrane Hofaidhllaoui

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 48, issue C

Abstract: This study examines the effect of introducing CSR criteria into CEO incentive pay on earnings management practices in French firms listed on the SBF 120 index. Based on panel data for 106 companies over a five-year period between 2014 and 2019, the empirical analysis shows that the inclusion of CSR criteria in compensation contracts reduces the extent of earnings management (as measured by discretionary accruals and real earnings management).

Keywords: CEO incentive pay; CSR criteria; Discretionary accruals; Real earnings management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:48:y:2022:i:c:s1544612322001659

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.102880

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