When and how to intervene for saving an entrepreneur’s crowdfunding campaign

Linda Salahaldin, Vineeth S. Varma and Salah Eddine Elayoubi

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 50, issue C

Abstract: This paper explores the ability of entrepreneurs to influence the course of their crowdfunding campaigns. We study the interaction among crowdfunders and observe the existence of thresholds on the collected funds at some pivotal moments below which crowdfunders may massively abandon a project and identify hopeless, doubtful, and safe regions. This observation motivates a higher-level Stackelberg game, where the entrepreneur intervenes to influence the behavior of crowdfunders and move his campaign from his current region to a more favorable one. Our results show that the entrepreneur can play a crucial role even with a limited intervention.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Funding decision; Self-funding; Dynamic programming; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:50:y:2022:i:c:s1544612322003956

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103189

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