What do boards consider in CEO performance evaluation? Evidence from executive turnover

Seungho Choi and Jing Xu

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 50, issue C

Abstract: This study investigates whether CEOs are rewarded for actively making changes. We construct a comprehensive executive dataset from SEC filings and use non-CEO executive turnover to proxy for changes. We find that after executive turnovers, CEOs are less likely to be dismissed, and the change is not temporary. In addition, firm performance improves after executive turnovers. The results suggest that when boards of directors evaluate CEOs, they consider whether CEOs can overcome inertia and initiate changes.

Keywords: CEO turnover; Top executives; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612322004196
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:50:y:2022:i:c:s1544612322004196

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103214

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().