EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does administrative monopoly regulation affect corporate financialization? From the perspective of vertical industrial chain competition in China

Nuo Xu, Yubin Gao, Lizhen Du and Liangzhi You

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 53, issue C

Abstract: Corporate financialization in China is a unique problem rooted in the institutional system. Excessive administrative intervention results in “administrative monopoly”, harming the business environment and stimulating the growth of corporate financialization. The Fair Competition Review System, FCRS, was introduced in 2016 to break local protectionism and regulate the administrative monopoly. This paper examines whether and how FCRS influences corporate financialization from the perspective of vertical industrial chain competition. Using data from China's listed companies from 2013 to 2019, we find that implementing FCRS has exerted a suppression effect on the level of financialization for the upstream corporations. Further, we find FCRS cuts off the financing support, and the managers will reserve more cash to mitigate the risk responsively, which crowds out the financial investment.

Keywords: Fair Competition Review System; Administrative monopoly regulation; Corporate financialization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612323000223
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:53:y:2023:i:c:s1544612323000223

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.103648

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:53:y:2023:i:c:s1544612323000223