Monitoring or Collusion? Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate ESG Performance: Evidence from China

Liang Wang, Jiahan Qi and Hongyu Zhuang

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 53, issue C

Abstract: We examine the collusion effects of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on corporate ESG performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for 2010–2020, we find that firms with MLS tend to have lower ESG performance than firms with a single large shareholder. This finding is robust to a series of robustness checks. Our conclusion is consistent with the common-benefit and cost-sharing hypothesis, where MLS shoulder the costs of poor ESG performance with the controlling shareholder and protect their common benefit through free-riding behavior.

Keywords: Multiple large shareholders; Corporate ESG performance; Ownership structure; Collusion effect; Cost sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G14 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:53:y:2023:i:c:s1544612323000478

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.103673

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