Enforcement of corporate misconduct during Democratic and Republican administrations

Daniel Neukirchen, Gerrit Köchling and Peter N. Posch

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 55, issue PA

Abstract: We examine the extent to which enforcement of corporate violations related to a variety of offenses differs under Republican and Democratic administrations. Using a data set covering the period from 2001 to 2020, we find the number of enforced corporate violations, the resulting penalties, and the average penalties to be significantly lower under Republican presidential administrations. The results hold when controlling for macroeconomic conditions and the level of power in the House and Senate, suggesting an important influence of the presidential administration.

Keywords: Misconduct; Politics; Sep enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:55:y:2023:i:pa:s1544612323002933

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.103921

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