Does the Antimonopoly Law improve companies’ cash-holding management efficiency? Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

Yiyun Zhao

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 55, issue PB

Abstract: Using listed firms’ data between 2004 and 2011, we find that China's Antimonopoly Law provokes a significant increase in firms’ cash-holding management efficiency; that is, cash holdings are more aligned with firms’ investment opportunities. We show that the increase in cash-holding management efficiency is more pronounced in less competitive industries and these increases are mainly driven by unrestricted industries. Financial constraint is an important channel through which competitive pressure would impact the cash-holding management efficiency. Our results are robust to different sample period selections and proxies for cash holding and investment opportunity.

Keywords: Antimonopoly law; Cash-holding management efficiency; Internal liquidity management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612323003252
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:55:y:2023:i:pb:s1544612323003252

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.103953

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().