Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information

Xiang Liu and Zhaojun Yang

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 57, issue C

Abstract: We compare two competitive financing schemes, loan guarantees and security token offerings (STOs), for a risk-averse entrepreneur to start a project. We show that, if information is symmetric, STOs are better than loan guarantees. Under asymmetric information, we derive the highest equity price that makes low-type entrepreneurs’ imitation unprofitable. If the project risk is sufficiently high, loan guarantees (STOs) induce pooling (separating) equilibrium, and otherwise the opposite holds. Generally the higher the project risk, the less the share of equity retained by entrepreneurs and the less the project value. STOs might make project value increase with project risk. In the view of high-type entrepreneurs, if project risk is not very high or entrepreneurs do not dislike risk too much, loan guarantees are better than STOs, and otherwise the opposite holds true.

Keywords: STOs; Loan guarantees; Information asymmetry; Signaling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G12 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:57:y:2023:i:c:s1544612323005433

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104171

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