Dynamic changes in corporate financialization during CEO tenure

Bao Qi and Peijie Fang

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 58, issue PB

Abstract: We examine the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate financialization using data of non-financial listed companies in Chinese A-share market from 2010 to 2021. We find that corporate financialization is weakened in the early stage of CEO tenure and strengthened in the late stage. Depending on the predictability of CEO's departure time, we classify departures as normal and abnormal. Only under normal departures do CEOs increase corporate financialization in their late tenure. We also find that CEOs of non-state-owned enterprises, older CEOs, and CEOs with lower shareholding ratio increase corporate financialization more in their late tenure.

Keywords: CEO tenure; Corporate financialization; Chinese A-share market; Horizon problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:58:y:2023:i:pb:s1544612323008280

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104456

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