A test of the widespread-point-shaving theory

Richard Borghesi and William Dare

Finance Research Letters, 2009, vol. 6, issue 3, 115-121

Abstract: We test whether corruption is widespread in NCAA basketball by examining scoring patterns in games involving suspected point shavers. If conspiracy occurs frequently, then we should find that strong favorites score fewer points and/or allow more points than expected. However, findings reveal that strong favorites, previously believed to be the most likely candidates to engage in point shaving, may instead be the least likely. We propose that a shift in coaching strategy late in blowout games explains the anomalous bet outcome distribution patterns previously identified in the NCAA basketball betting market.

Keywords: Point; shaving; NCAA; Basketball; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:6:y:2009:i:3:p:115-121

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